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Abstract
Philosophical conceptual analysis is an experimental method. Focusing on this
helps to justify it from the skepticism of experimental philosophers who follow
Weinberg, Nichols & Stich (2001). To explore the experimental aspect of philo-
sophical conceptual analysis, I consider a simpler instance of the same activity:
everyday linguistic interpretation. I argue that this, too, is experimental in nature.
And in both conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation, the intuitions con-
sidered problematic by experimental philosophers are necessary but epistemically
irrelevant. They are like variables introduced into mathematical proofs which
drop out before the solution. Or better, they are like the hypotheses that drive
science, which do not themselves need to be true. In other words, it does not
matter whether or not intuitions are accurate as descriptions of the natural kinds
that undergird philosophical concepts; the aims of conceptual analysis can still be
met.
Experimental philosophers have called into question the use of intuitions in philo-
sophical conceptual analysis, which is claimed to be a cornerstone of traditional
philosophical methodology. They argue that intuitions about philosophical con-
cepts are unreliable because we cannot calibrate them against the world. What
this or that group of people think of justice, is not necessarily what justice is. We
need a way for conceptual analysis to make contact with the object of study—and
bringing our culturally-indoctrinated and unstable intuitions into reWective equi-
librium is not the way. Philosophy, it is claimed, is most reliable when it operates
like science: collecting empirical data, testing hypotheses, and formalizing em-
pirical generalities into mathematical relationships. Perhaps conceptual analysis
should be left behind.
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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One reason this conclusion is mistaken is that conceptual analysis is already
quite scientiVc. Science is a reVnement of our normal thinking patterns with its
roots going all the way back to child’s play (see for example, Cook, Goodman
& Schulz 2011). Why think that conceptual analysis, a reVned version of other
linguistic practices, is divorced from those same proud origins? Imre Lakatos
argued that all of mathematics is nothing more than a series of conceptual refor-
mations, which produces better and better deVnitions of mathematical concepts
by a never-ending onslaught of counterexamples (1976). For Lakatos, this process
is at once a mental, linguistic, and community activity and it achieves some epis-
temic good. Mathematics is thought to yield certainty, and plays an indispensable
role in physical science. Perhaps philosophical conceptual analysis can be legit-
imated in a similar way, if philosophy plays an indispensable role in science as
well. Yet this is not the argument I want to make. Rather, I argue that conceptual
analysis in philosophy is a dynamic process which can be defended epistemologi-
cally because of important features it shares not with mathematics, but with the
scientiVc method.
Conceptual analysis can be deVned functionally. One of its goals is to specify
the extension of a concept. For example, what does justice refer to? Part of this
is Vnding properties common to all or most instances of a concept, or outlining
relationships between the extensions or intensions of concepts. For example, are
all the instances of water instances of H2O? Are electrons only to be found in
the context of an atom? Another goal that is somewhat independent of the last
few is specifying the “normative proVle” (or normative characteristics) of a con-
cept. This goal asks what should be the extension of a concept, or its relation
to other concepts. A successful conceptual analysis of knowledge should there-
fore reveal which things count as known, what it is about them that makes them
known (for example, as opposed to only believed), how known things relate to
true things, and so on. But also, such an analysis must tell us what should count
as known, what should be the relation between the known and the true, and so
on. The diUerence between conceptual analysis in philosophy on the one hand,
and science on the other, is that the normative proVles of scientiVc concepts (for
example, quark) can be quite thin. Determining their extensions and conceptual
relations are often more important than sketching their normative proVles. Ask-
ing what quark should refer to is a sensible question, but in practice it is less
central to scientiVc research than Vnding the properties common to quarks and
268
Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an Experimental Method
the relations between quarks and other physical-theoretical entities. A diUerent
emphasis is often found in philosophical conceptual analysis, wherein normative
considerations predominate. However, the diUerence is only one of degree.
One important motivation ofMeaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation is
to push interdisciplinary boundaries, and considering conceptual analysis as an
experimental method takes this motivation seriously because it brings together
evidence from the study of language, cognitive science and philosophy of science.
I argue that in both conceptual analysis and scientiVc inquiry we form hypothe-
ses and then “test” them. The literature on scientiVc experiment is massive (for
example, Ackermann 1985, Batens & Van Bendegem 1988, Bogen & Woodward
1988, Cartwright 1983, Collins & Pinch 1993, Franklin 1986, 1990, 2002, Galison
1987, 1997, Gooding 1990, Gooding et al. 1989, Hacking 1983, Latour & Woolgar
1986, Pickering 1985, Pinch 1986). Yet aside from a few German Idealists, very
few have written about experimenting with concepts as linguistic entities (see
Fehige & Stuart 2014). After presenting the problem from experimental philos-
ophy in more detail, I look at conceptual experimentation from two sides. First, I
examine some relevant literature from cognitive science as an attempt to describe
the mechanisms at work in conceptual experimentation. Second, I propose a pre-
liminary account that attempts to defend the epistemological status of conceptual
analysis conceived as a type of experimental linguistic interpretation.
1 Experimental philosophy and skepticism about
conceptual analysis
Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich helped found a sub-discipline in philosophy with
their 2001 paper, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” In it, they identiVed a
type of philosophical strategy they called “Epistemic Romanticism.” Accounts that
employ this strategy, like Plato’s, rely on the premise that conceptual knowledge,
for example, knowledge of the Forms, is already implanted in us, and we may
extract it in dialogue. Weinberg, Nichols and Stich call the family of theories
that work this way “Intuition Driven Romanticism,” since they consider shared
intuitions as evidence for a kind of innate, a priori knowledge.
For these authors and many of those who followed them (for example, Alexan-
der et al. 2010, Knobe & Nichols 2008, Machery et al. 2004, Mallon et al. 2009,
Swain et al. 2008, Weinberg et al. 2006), an intuition is simply a spontaneous
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judgment about the properties of some case for which the agent may not be able
to oUer any plausible justiVcation. Intuition Driven Romanticism takes intuitions
as data, and then produces normative epistemic claims that are dependent on the
intuitions used, at least in part. That is, if the input were diUerent, the output
would also be diUerent (in proportion to the change in the input). Two examples
they give of Intuition Driven Romanticism are reWective equilibrium (see Good-
man 1955) and Alvin Goldman’s “justiVcatory rules” (see Goldman 1986:60).
Thus, some group of cognitive agents might have intuitions and belief-forma-
tion processes that are diUerent from those of western philosophers, and when
they run their intuitions through their chosen method (for example, reWective
equilibrium) they will emerge with diUerent epistemic norms. The question is:
how can we decide which set of norms to follow? There is no answer that is
not also subject to objections about relativity, so the whole process is misguided.
Epistemic norms will be relative to diUerent cultures, socio-economic classes,
and even the number of philosophy courses taken. And it is argued that such
intuition-relativity does in fact exist. Here is a famous example of the type of
evidence presented.
A scenario called “the Trutemp Case” is presented to survey volunteers. The
case consists of the following report: A child on a deserted island gets hit on
the head by a coconut, and as a result knows the exact temperature all the time,
but does not know that he has this power. The survey volunteers are asked:
when the child says, “It is 30 degrees Celsius,” does he know this, or does he only
believe it? Apparently, East Asian people are more likely than Westerners to
say that a person so aUected only believes their temperature guess. However, if
you say instead that a team of scientists secretly tinkered with the boy’s brain
to cause this ability, the situation reverses and East Asian people become more
likely than Westerners to report that the boy knows what he says. And Vnally, if
you also say that many other people in the boy’s community were secretly given
the ability to tell the temperature, and then ask the knowledge question about a
single member’s belief about the temperature, East Asians are even more likely to
attribute knowledge. The Westerners keep their judgments essentially constant
over all these changes. The conclusion drawn is that the relation between a
person and their community aUects the epistemological status of their beliefs,
but only if you are East Asian.
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In another well-known example, a Gettier case is presented to diUerent cultural
groups with each group providing consistently diUerent responses. A standard
case is about my friend who thinks George has an American car. In fact, just
yesterday George traded in his Buick for a Pontiac (which is still American),
so my friend says something true, and justiVed, when she says “George has an
American car.” Now, when asked if my friend knows the above statement, more
East Asians than Westerners respond in the aXrmative.
Weinberg, Nichols and Stich conclude that intuition-based analyses only pro-
vide information about the people who participate in them, and not any mind-
independent truths about the referents of philosophical concepts. Unfortunately,
mind-independent truths are precisely what “epistemically romantic” philoso-
phers seek.
If the above analysis of intuition-relativity is correct, I want to argue that this
still would not aUect the possibility of successful conceptual analysis, since the
epistemic status of those intuitions is irrelevant to the outcome of conceptual
analysis. They are epistemically irrelevant in exactly the same way that hy-
potheses in science are epistemically irrelevant to the status of the output of
the experimental method: namely, good science can be done with false hypothe-
ses. If successful, this argument would not make that output infallible: there are
well known issues concerning the epistemic status of the scientiVc experimental
method. Someone might object that it is not meaningful to talk about “the” ex-
perimental method as though it were one thing. Yet I will assume that there are
interesting commonalities shared by diUerent instances of experimental methods
in science which we may focus on in a general way; that there is something we
can call the experimental method of science, and it is among the best epistemic
methods we have at our disposal, will be a shared assumption given the exper-
imental nature of “experimental” philosophy.
Now that we know the criticism, let us look more closely at the role of intuition
in conceptual analysis.
2 Conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation
Conceptual analysis can be understood as an instance of linguistic interpretation
(Cohnitz & Häggqvist 2009:9). When philosophers try to discover the content
of say, knowledge or justice, they often begin by outlining how the concept is
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used (in philosophy, or in some other context of discourse) in order to discover
the purpose it serves. Using this knowledge, we attempt to extrapolate or create
meaning. We do the same thing when we consider the meaning of a linguis-
tic entity. Conceiving of conceptual analysis as an act of interpretation helps to
clarify the connection to experimentalism and avoid the problems of intuition
skepticism, since the intuitions involved in linguistic interpretation need not be
epistemically justiVed to serve their purpose. In cases of linguistic interpretation,
we need to start somewhere to Vgure out the meaning of an utterance. If we begin
with intuitions based on previous experience with a speaker, or a perceived type
of speaker, or other contextual features, this will usually speed things up. But
we need not begin with accurate information or accurate intuitions. Given the
script of a conversation not meant speciVcally to deceive us, we can discover a
great deal about the meaning of unfamiliar terms. This sort of activity is what
Quine and Davidson discussed using models of Radical Translation and Radical
Interpretation. The intuitions we begin with need not be true or accurate or in-
nate or epistemically privileged because interpretation is a special kind of iterated
process, one that can begin with false premises and proceed to true conclusions
by repeated application of the same method. Perhaps beginning the process of
interpretation with very bad intuitions will drag it out, because we have to throw
out the unhelpful intuitions and begin again with others until we Vnd the truth,
but it will always be possible to complete, at least in principle. It is one of the
very few methods that enjoy this status, the scientiVc method being another.
Here is a quick example. If my friend gestures towards a nearby harbour and
remarks, “What an aggressive chine,” I may guess that a chine is a type of boat,
an in-harbour manoeuvring technique, a person, or almost anything else. What I
know about my friend and human linguistic behaviour generally will constrain
my guesses signiVcantly. The resulting conversation will disqualify many possi-
ble interpretations and if we continue to discuss chines, I can adjust my questions
and guesses without needing to ask what a chine is, until I arrive at the conclu-
sion that it refers to the angle of a boat’s hull. From there I can come to learn
the diUerences between hard and soft chines and the advantages of each. This a
common experience, especially for those who learn a new language. Is something
similar going on when we perform conceptual analysis?
When we set out to analyze a concept in philosophy, we are immediately faced
with several diUerent aspects of that concept out of which we identify one (or
272
Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an Experimental Method
some) to be more interesting than the rest. For example, concerning knowledge
we have knowledge that and knowledge how. We could ask whether such a
division is a natural division in the concept, for example, by comparing similar
ones embodied by the French savoir and connaître and the Spanish saber and
conocer. What we decide to analyze depends on what we want to know. This
tells us that some complex concepts must be divided into sub-concepts for easier
study, but it also informs us of the diUerent norms that may lie hidden in the
concept. Concepts can take the form of exemplars, prototypes, atoms, theories,
family resemblances, necessary and suXcient conditions, and all kinds of hybrids
(see Margolis & Laurence 1999, DePaul & Ramsey 1998). Instead of arguing which
of these really captures what we desire from a theory of concepts (pace Prinz
2002), we should ask what these diUerent characterizations of concepts are good
for; what kinds of concept use they capture and which concepts types are better
for characterizing speciVc concepts.
Despite being more complex, philosophical conceptual analysis appears essen-
tially similar to the above example with the chine. We provisionally propose some
deVnition for a concept. Then we imagine diUerent cases in which the actual use
(or proper use) of a term conWicts with the proposed deVnition. If by this process
we do not reach an acceptable deVnition, we begin to look for ways of splitting
up the concept, or ways of softening the requirement of necessary and suXcient
conditions by seeking only exemplars, prototypes, or family resemblances. Sup-
posing that there are correct answers to questions like, “What does S mean when
she says x?” and, “What should S mean when she says x?”, then likewise there
will be answers to questions like, “What do we mean when we use concept x?”
and, “What should we mean when we use concept x?”
Assuming that conceptual analysis is indeed an instance of linguistic interpre-
tation, what evidence is there that the mechanisms which underlie these actions
are experimental? Consider what Francis Jacob, a Nobel Prize winning biologist,
recently had to say about the practice of science:
In art as in science, the essential thing is to try out. On the one hand, to try out
oppositions of colour or harmonizing themes or combinations of words, then to
reject what you don’t like. On the other hand, to try things; to try ideas, each
idea that comes into our heads; each possibility one by one, systematically; then
to toss out what doesn’t work experimentally and accept what does work, even
if that goes against our tastes and biases. Most of the time such attempts lead
nowhere. But sometimes the most outlandish experiment happens to open up
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a new rail. The beginning of any research is always a leap into the unknown.
It’s always after the event that we form judgements on the level of interest of
the initial hypothesis. Wrong ideas and outlandish theories abound in science.
They are as abundant as bad works of art. (Jacob 2001:118)
Science, for Jacob, is clearly continuous with everyday thinking. When faced
with something we want to understand, we begin by “trying out” ideas, combina-
tions of words, and so on, and many of these avenues become closed. What makes
science special is the thoroughness with which the new ideas are tested. But, as
he says, “The beginning of any research is always a leap into the unknown.” Could
the same be true of linguistic interpretation and conceptual analysis?
Recent research seems to indicate that it is. Reiner & Gilbert (2004) asked
students to analyze a physical mechanism that behaves in an unexpected way
(thanks to some hidden magnets). Given a list of the materials out of which the
mechanism was built, diUerent sets of students all followed a common natural
method of inquiry: Vrst they constructed various models that could capture what
they observed in the mechanism. Then they created what the authors called a
“representational space” or in other words, a series of abstract concepts and rela-
tions between them, often using pen and paper, that would capture the behaviour
of the mechanism as represented in their models. Finally, they tested their ab-
stract models in imaginary worlds using thought experiments.
Reiner and Gilbert argue that all of this is done spontaneously. Physical exper-
iments and thought experiments intertwine seamlessly in the learning process.
They claim that “the process of alternating between these twomodes—empirically
experimenting and experimenting in thought—leads towards a convergence on
scientiVcally acceptable concepts” (p. 1819). According to Reiner and Gilbert,
“Conceptual construction starts by negotiating meaning, with self and with oth-
ers, through ‘what-if’ questions that turn into imaginary experiments in thought,
ultimately being applied to the original physical situation (p. 1821). This senti-
ment is echoed in Reiner & Burko (2003), which argues that “as in the physics
community, through social discussions of thought experiments, conclusions and
thought processes are negotiated, leading to conceptual reVnement” (2003:380)
(see also Gilbert & Reiner 2000, Stuart forthcoming, Velentzas & Halkia 2013).
I highlight these passages which focus on thought experiments because of their
use of the imagination. In the process of conceptual reVnement, both students and
experts have been documented using imaginary worlds to invent and reVne hy-
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potheses, in many diUerent problem solving scenarios (see for example, Stephens
& Clement 2006, Clement 2009, Kosem & Özdemir 2014).
Perhaps it is not far-fetched to claim that everyone, not just students of science,
learn to build and evaluate models to invent, evaluate and reVne new concepts in a
way that draws on general knowledge about the world and individual experience,
using the imagination. And this is precisely what we should expect if linguistic
interpretation is in some sense an experimental method.
If this is true, we should discuss how conceptual analysis works by discussing
the mechanisms that underlie it. We could begin with the input from the imagina-
tion, since hypotheses in science and proposed deVnitions in conceptual analysis
both depend on it. Hypotheses are not beliefs; they are imaginings of ways the
world could be. What makes a belief good or bad is whether it is true or false.
This is not the case with an imagining. For example, my imagining an empty soda
can on the dark side of the moon is not better (qua imagining) if there is in fact an
empty soda can there.
What does make one imagining better than another? The answer to this de-
pends on what we want to do with the imagining. Perhaps we want to devise
an imagining that shows us an example of pure altruism. In this case, reading
A Tale of Two Cities might be better than watching a children’s cartoon. A more
common and general aim is to provide a counterexample to a modal claim, and
examples of these abound in science and philosophy (see Cohintz 2003, Häggqvist
1996, Sorensen 1992). Better imaginings will serve their purpose faster and more
eXciently, or they will have wonderful consequences. But they need not be true.
Christopher Columbus had a hypothesis about a route to India, and it was mis-
taken. But it was still eminently useful when tested (Lakatos 1976:14). The same
considerations hold for scientiVc hypotheses. Atomism, for example, was im-
portant as a metaphysical hypothesis in Ancient Greece, but it was not a good
scientiVc hypothesis until much later. And the phlogiston-theory was a good hy-
pothesis although it was false, because it was fruitful, testable and had a certain
degree of explanatory power. (For an argument against the use of the imagination
in philosophy, see Thagard 2014. For a defence, see Stuart 2014).
In the case of science, conceptual analysis, and linguistic interpretation, we
propose judgments which are then in some sense, tested. In science, these judg-
ments are called hypotheses, and in conceptual analysis and linguistic interpreta-
tion they may be called intuitions. In all cases, they rely heavily on the imagi-
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nation, and they appear at many stages of inquiry, even in testing. Furthermore,
they need not be true or even formed reliably. No one is surprised or distraught
that many or even most scientiVc hypotheses are incorrect as descriptions of the
world, because science has a method for screening these out. Likewise, we should
not be concerned that many or most of our intuitions concerning the referents
of philosophical concepts are incorrect. Nevertheless, to justify the use of intu-
itions which are spontaneous and stem in the imagination in conceptual analysis,
a philosophical account is necessary.
3 Epistemological considerations
Intuitions are involved as part of the guessing process we adopt on the way to
understanding linguistic actions and events. Your friend asks if you would like to
go to the restaurant across the street. But you know the street well and there is no
restaurant there. You immediately have an intuition that she means the jazz bar,
which does not serve food. Perhaps you have this intuition because your friend
loves jazz, and the music has just now become audible. This intuition becomes
your working assumption concerning the meaning of the term “restaurant” in
this context, until it is conVrmed or denied.
I propose to relate the epistemology of intuitions like these and the roles they
play in linguistic interpretation to hypotheses and their roles in science. As Ja-
cob said above, hypotheses are leaps into the unknown, and can be bad or even
outlandish. In science they are found in all levels, from experimental, for exam-
ple, in planning an experiment, to the most theoretical, for example, in dealing
with anomalies or developing new formalisms. Leaving aside the exact sciences,
hypotheses are never ultimately proven or disproven: they remain open to con-
tradiction or vindication by future experience. The two things most important for
my purposes is that they are not used as proof or evidence, and while they are
being tested they are not true or false. We should oppose them to ideas, beliefs
and commitments which are in this analogy like theories—put forth as candidates
for knowledge. Extending this analogy, the goal of interpretation is the meaning
of a term, including its intension, extension, relation to other terms and norma-
tive proVle. The end goal of scientiVc investigation is something like accuracy
or truth, but the more common achievement, which is taken to be a sign of a
successful investigation, is what Francis Bacon called “power over nature.” If I
276
Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an Experimental Method
introduce a new term in discourse, I will be satisVed that you have understood it
at least partially when you can use the new term in conversation to achieve your
ends. Likewise, we understand a phenomenon in science at least partially when
we can use it to achieve our ends. These practical abilities are signs of success,
and are therefore epistemologically signiVcant. In science, the iterated process
of hypothesis, test and theoretical revision is well-known (see for example, Lau-
den 1973, Peirce 1898). Hasok Chang has coined the term “epistemic iteration”
to refer to the scientiVc process in which “we start by adopting an existing sys-
tem of knowledge, with some respect for it but without any Vrm assurance that
it is correct; on the basis of that initially aXrmed system we launch inquiries
that result in the reVnement and even correction of the original system. It is this
self-correcting progress that justiVes (retrospectively) successful courses of de-
velopment in science, not any assurance by reference to some indubitable foun-
dation” (2004:6). In science, we always have multiple hypotheses being developed
at once, if for no other reason than underdetermination of theory by evidence.
“Accepting plurality means accepting imprecision, which we can actually aUord
to do in quite a few cases, with a promise of later tightening” (Chang 2004:158).
This “later tightening” consists in empirical testing, calibration of measurement
devices, and reVnements of cogency and applicability (p. 234). If the analogy to
linguistic interpretation is to hold, there must be a tightening process analogous
to the one in science.
I would like to argue that Donald Davidson’s “principle of charity” could be
seen as one such tightening mechanism. Davidson was not the Vrst to propose a
principle of charity, but his is perhaps the most inWuential account (see his 2001a,
2001b, 2005). For Davidson, the principle of charity is not one thing; it is an
umbrella term that covers many diUerent and complementary constraints. This
group of constraints makes possible successful communication within reasonable
time periods. By successful we do not mean Wawless: we make mistakes and
will be wrong about many of the beliefs and meanings we attribute. Here is
Davidson’s account.
We must know both the meaning of someone’s utterance and their relevant
underlying beliefs and their propositional attitudes (believing, doubting, fearing,
etc.) if we want to understand their utterance. However, we can guess some of
these elements if we know the others. For example if I say “The World Cup is
my favourite sporting event” and you know what this sentence means and that
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I believe it, then you will be able to surmise some of my beliefs about soccer.
Likewise, if you know my beliefs about soccer and tournaments, you can garner
an idea of what the sentence “The World Cup is my favourite Sporting Event”
means when I point to the match schedule and I jump up and down clapping my
hands, even if I utter the sentence in a language with which you are unfamiliar.
But how can you understand my meaning if you do not know either my relevant
beliefs, attitudes, or the meaning of my words? This is Davidson’s famous case
of Radical Interpretation. Here, the key is the propositional attitude of assertion.
Davidson thinks we can easily discern this without help from either meaning or
belief. If you can tell what someone holds true (or seems to hold true) you can
make and test hypotheses for what they mean, and since these attributions will
be constrained by certain factors, you can tighten your guesses until you Vnd the
correct theory of meaning. The principle of charity explains the way we do this
guesswork. It tells us that we superimpose our logic on the speaker, posit events
and objects as the ontology of our shared realities (known to both speaker and
interpreter) and assume that the speaker’s beliefs are mostly true. And we do
not just assume them to hold mostly true beliefs; we try to maximize the truth
of their beliefs, whenever possible. If I hear you say, “I saw the Grand Canyon
Wying to California” there are at least two ways to understand this, and you can
bet I will not select the option which attributes to you the belief that canyons can
Wy. While it is not necessary that any speciVc belief of our speaker be true, his or
her beliefs must be true on the whole, because you could not interpret someone
who was in systematic error (that is, in error about everything). You could not
even disagree with them. Given the way a speaker uses their words and this
principle, we can create a theory of meaning for a speaker that could provide in
advance the meaning of every possible utterance they might make, by recursion
and composition.
However, using a principle of charity that maximizes the truth of your speaker
to provide an account of meaning is not without its critics. Analysing some
criticism is a good way to explore and update Davidson’s principle of charity
as an epistemological tool analogous to the method of scientiVc experimentation.
I will focus on the inWuential criticism of Timothy Williamson.
Williamson argues that any principle of charity that “crudely maximizes true
belief” (2004:139) will often recommend incorrect attributions. If I believe many
things that are false about X but true about Y, it would seem that such a principle
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would recommend that my interpreter ascribe Y as the object of my X-utterances
and beliefs so as to maximize the number of true beliefs that I hold, regardless
of my intention that they be about X. We would like to think that some causal
history between X and myself is what makes my thoughts have X-content, but
why? Williamson says it is because causal history often implies past perceptual
experience, which is a “channel” for knowledge (p. 140).
I bring up this worry because a similar objection is levelled at conceptual anal-
ysis from experimental philosophers, mentioned at the start. Namely, without
an objective perspective on knowledge or justice themselves, we do not know
whether we are analysing the same thing when diUerent groups of people anal-
yse their versions of these concepts. That is, our tightening procedure does not
tighten enough.
Here is an example from Williamson. A psychic makes a prediction about the
life history and personality of Santiago. It turns out that this life story and person-
ality more accurately describe a third person, say, Nico. According to Williamson,
Davidson’s principle recommends that we attribute all of the psychic’s beliefs
about Santiago’s character traits and history to Nico and not Santiago, since this
will make more of our psychic’s beliefs and utterances true. Since we know that
the physic actually intends to have their utterances be about Santiago, and David-
son’s principle forces us to attribute them to Nico, we have a reductio against
Davidson’s account. It is because of the causal (in this case visual) connection be-
tween the psychic and Santiago that we still take his or her beliefs and utterances
to be about Santiago, even though they are truer of Nico.
And the same could be true about conceptual analysis. Making our own beliefs
come out true and consistent would not guarantee that they refer to the right
things, or even that such things exist and we can refer to them.
Another example concerns ascribing knowledge of quantum physical laws to
people from the Stone Age, since this will help maximize the truth of their be-
liefs. These ascriptions do not occur on Williamson’s account since we need to
have a knowledge-channel (or causal connection) between the speaker and his or
her objects of speech in order to ascribe something as the source of their belief.
For these reasons, Williamson suggests a knowledge (instead of truth) maximiz-
ing principle of charity, which relies on being in the relevant position to know
something.
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According to Williamson, you cannot be in a position to know something un-
less that something is actually happening (that is, you cannot know that it is rain-
ing unless it true that it is). You also need the right kind of causal contact with the
object of your utterance or thought. Finally, we also will not ascribe knowledge
to people if that ascription would rely on inferences that are not sound.
My reply to this worry is that truth is a simpler concept than knowledge.
It is easier to understand and less presumptuous to assume. Davidson calls it
“beautifully transparent” (2001b:139). It seems natural to think that “snow is
white is true” is equivalent to “snow is white.” On the other hand, saying “snow is
white is known” makes little sense without a subject that knows, and a context
in which that something is known. If we provide a subject for whom “snow is
white” is known, then several things might still be meant by such an ascription.
To counter on behalf of Williamson, we could argue that “snow is white is true”
can also be relativized to a person and context. However, to do so would be
to ignore the adage: ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet—from a contradiction
everything follows. If we allow truth to be relative to a speaker, then we must
admit that, from a higher level, the same sentence can be both true and false.
If this is granted, it makes possible the derivation of anything, even absurdities,
from a set of beliefs we thought were conservative and rational (for more on this
principle, see Priest et al. 1989). So it is unlikely that any account that allows this
kind of simple truth relativization will be used by an opponent of Williamson.
Another point for the simplicity of truth is that in philosophical logic it is a
much more basic concept than knowledge. Knowledge is usually introduced as
an operator, and doing so creates intensional or opaque contexts. If we assume
our speakers and audiences share a basic level of rationality, and we also as-
sume that philosophical logic is a reasonably good model of that rationality, then
truth is the simpler concept since logic tells us that an understanding of truth is
necessary and antecedent to argumentative reasoning, unlike knowledge which
creates situations where substitution of co-referential expressions does not nec-
essarily preserve truth. Further, unlike knowledge, truth does not suUer from
Gettier cases or the cultural variation eUects found by experimental philosophers
like Weinberg, Stich, and Nichols. What is simpler is also perhaps more likely to
Vt into an evolutionary picture of the development of language and interpretive
strategies.
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This focus on simplicity might seem strange; after all, Williamsonmight be pro-
viding a more complicated albeit more accurate account, and surely that would
be relevant. And in some cases we do seem to attribute knowledge (and not just
truth) when we interpret someone. Williamson argues that causal history is the
connection between subject and object which opens the channel to knowledge.
Whether something is true or false does not matter—what matters is whether
there is a causal connection between the subject and some scenario that justi-
Ves their knowledge claims. This is appealing, but although he is not credited,
Davidson also knew such causal history would be necessary. In fact, it is part of
what his charity demands. He says, “[W]e interpret so as to make an agent as
intelligible as possible . . . Vnding him right means identifying the causes with
the objects of his beliefs, giving special weight to the simplest cases, and counte-
nancing error where it can be best explained” (2001b:152). It is a subtler principle
than Williamson gives him credit for, as the causal history requirement falls right
out of the rationality constraints. You would not ascribe an object as the source
of someone’s belief if they had never had any contact with it. And you wouldn’t
ascribe quantum physical knowledge to people in the Stone Age, either. For much
the same reasons as Williamson, then, Davidson’s principle explains why we as-
cribe what we do as the cause or content of people’s beliefs or utterances, only
if they have had relevant causal contact with them.
Finally, for Williamson, ascribing knowledge to a person means that such a
person must have been in the requisite position to know. This means that the
proposition known refers to a state of aUairs that was actually happening, exist-
ing, or was in whatever sense, actual at the time of utterance. In other words, the
proposition known is also true, since it matches the world. This means that when-
ever we ascribe knowledge we are also ascribing truth. So again, Williamson was
right to focus on the causal connection, but not about truth being less desirable
for charity than knowledge.
Williamson has a second and independent worry: should we agree with David-
son in thinking that the principle of charity is a maximizing process? Since our
belief set is inVnite (that is, all the beliefs that can be ascribed to any one of us
at any time is inVnite, because of recursion), and if we think of maximization as
a simple, linear process, Williamson is surely right when he objects that maxi-
mizing truth is impossible. How do you maximize the amount of anything in an
inVnite set? An answer is given by Henry Jackman (2003). He argues that charity
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should be seen as applying only to the weighted sum of a speaker’s commitments.
You can think of the weighing function as analogous to the way we place dif-
ferent values on questions when devising a test. It need not be esoteric. And
those beliefs to which we are committed form a set that is not inVnite, because
it contains only the beliefs to which we would be disposed to assent if queried.
(It also contains our implicit presuppositions and assumptions, but these are in-
cluded insofar as they can be clearly inferred from our actions, so the set remains
Vnite). The heaviest (or core) commitments are those we would Vght the hardest
to retain in cases of conWict.
To understand the charity we confer to others, Jackman examines the way
we interpret ourselves in cases where core commitments conWict. If, in Quinean
fashion, we always save those beliefs we treasure the most, then in cases where
some core commitments conWict, we will eliminate beliefs on a case-by-case basis
by maximization. We do this depending on the level of importance we assign to
our commitments. Jackman argues that such a process would naturally go hand
in hand with the way we interpret others. Consider a situation in which you take
a sip of what you believe is a mug of hot chocolate, and Vnd that it tastes exactly
like tea. Now you have a conWict between your belief that your cup contains
hot chocolate, your belief that it contains tea, and your belief that the same cup
cannot contain tea and hot chocolate at the same time. This conWict may be dealt
with in various ways, but it is much more likely that you will give up the belief,
for example, that your drink is hot chocolate, than your belief in the law of non-
contradiction, or your belief that hot chocolate does not turn into tea without
some serious chemical tampering. This is a simple example where maximization
is used, to show that such a process is uncontentious as far as the maximization
component is concerned.
If the application of Jackman’s idea to this context is correct, this adds to the
above defense of Davidson’s principle of charity. Namely, if the object of our
maximization is the weighted sum of commitments held by the speaker, then
having a causal history with the cause of the belief or utterance will certainly
make some beliefs heavier than others in meaning ascriptions. This helps to show
that being in a position to know will be important for the way that we maximize
truth, without showing that knowledge is what should be maximized. Being in
a position to know is important for the practice of interpretation; it Vgures into
the way we do it.
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If the process of maximizing truth applies to the weighted sum of a speaker’s
commitments, and if we are also trying to minimize the amount of unexplained
error, then we will usually be maximizing knowledge as well. Especially if Jack-
man is correct that “Capturing the interpretee’s perspective on the world . . . in-
volves trying to understand the interpretee as she would, ideally, understand her-
self” (2003:161), because Vguring out which beliefs the interpretee weighs the
heaviest, will likely yield the beliefs that the interpretee feels she knows. This
account is consistent with the results of psychological studies in empathy, which
show that those who attempt to think like others really do understand them bet-
ter (see Ickes 2003, Stueber 2006), and it also coheres with studies that show
sociopaths have diXculty communicating because their ability to see things as
others do is reduced (see Baron-Cohen 2011, MeUert et al. 2013, Skeem et al.
2011).
I do not deny that knowledge maximization is part of linguistic interpretation.
But the simplicity and fundamentality of truth for interpretation suggests at least
a logical and temporal order to the way we apply the principle of charity. First,
we ascribe rationality, then truth, and then knowledge. These three levels will
be separated in time because the psychological constraints that apply to each
are diUerent in terms of their respective strengths, and because there are more
or less ways to complete each operation. There are very few ways to satisfy
the rationality constraint, but there are more options in satisfying the truth con-
straint, and even more in maximizing knowledge. Since more and more conscious
thought will be necessary to complete the latter requirements, they should take
longer to complete, hence the chronological nature of the principle of charity.
This demands empirical testing. For now, however, I will merely add a few more
theoretical considerations.
Let us consider again the urgency of each type of constraint, beginning with
rationality. Davidson says, “We have no choice . . . but to read our own logic into
the thoughts of a speaker” (2001b:149). If I had to determine consciously whether
a speaker was following rules of logic that were relevantly similar to my own, I
would never be able to communicate with anyone. If this were the case, it seems
unlikely that language would have developed in the Vrst place. Turning to truth,
Jackman says that when we interpret ourselves we must assume the general truth
of our weighed set of commitments. To see this, notice that we generally see little
diUerence between our beliefs about the world and the beliefs that we hold true.
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We could not interpret ourselves if we needed to determine the overall truth of
our beliefs Vrst. Instead, we merely assume they are true. However, if pressed
we admit the unlikelihood that all of our beliefs are true, and we do expect to Vnd
some contradiction between them (2003:160). To extend this to our interpretation
of others, not only will we generally assume the truth of most of our own beliefs,
but we must assume the general truthfulness of someone else’s beliefs, because
again, if they were in massive error (if most of what they believed was false)
they would not make any sense to us. It is easy to imagine talking to someone
who thought up was down and alive was dead and real was fake and trees were
lampshades, but it is very diXcult to imagine understanding them. In this way,
we must attribute truth and rationality to a speaker to understand them.
However, do we need to attribute knowledge to a speaker? Imagine someone
who had mostly true but unjustiVed beliefs because they were raised by parents
who were experts in creating Gettier cases. We would still easily understand
the meaning of his or her words, since they would be talking about the same
objects, events and relations with which we are familiar. However, we should not
attribute to them knowledge of what they say. And this is the point. Williamson is
right that we should take casual histories into account when we interpret others,
he is wrong when he says that we should reject truth maximization in favour
of knowledge maximization. Let me Vnish by presenting a case where ascribing
knowledge leads to undesirable results.
Imagine you are certain that a mobster has committed murder. He told you
he was going to kill Rocco, and shortly after the time speciVed, the police Vnd
Rocco murdered in the manner antecedently speciVed to you by the mobster. The
mobster gloats and reveals that he knows speciVcs of the crime scene to which
no one besides the police and the killer had access. You call the police and he
is arrested. The police agree that he is guilty. Yet, there is not enough evidence
to put him away (it is your word against his, he has a good lawyer and his alibi
is carefully worked out). Suppose you say something true when you say, “That
man is guilty.” This, however, is not something that you can provide complete
justiVcation for, either to a jury of your peers in a court of law, or with absolute
certainty to yourself. And this is the problem with knowledge maximization as
a part of applying charity: knowledge is intimately linked to justiVcation, which
is not something we can maximize.
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In fact, maximizing justiVcation would be dangerous. It might invite overconV-
dence in ourselves, and lead us to expect radicalism or fanaticism in others. Most
of our everyday beliefs, even the true ones, simply are not justiVed in any ro-
bust, skepticism-defeating sense. Williamson could reply that justiVcation is not
linked to knowledge this intimately, but I think his use of “positions to know”
shows that it is. These positions are meant to justify knowledge ascriptions to a
third party, but if we can interpret ourselves, and if knowledge is recursive, then
you may only know that you know when you know you are in the requisite posi-
tion to know, that is, when you know you have enjoyed the right kind of causal
connection with the object of your knowledge. That is, when you are justiVed.
When we interpret a speaker, we apply the principle of charity and maximize
the truth of their beliefs, and perhaps their knowledge as well. But without
educated guesses concerning what our speaker means, we have nothing on which
to work. Such guesses are a necessary Vrst step, although this is not something
Davidson focused on. These “guesses” Vt the description of “intuition” given by
experimental philosophers. That is, they are not themselves justiVed by anything,
and we do not feel any need to justify them; they are not quite beliefs, and they
appear seemingly out of nowhere. Finally, the outcomes of interpretation are
counterfactually dependent on them. And yet, as we have seen, it is not important
if these guesses are good or bad, since the constraints involved in applying the
principle of charity are so strong that we are quickly forced from our starting
point to converge on a better interpretation.
But we do not always stop when we have interpreted our speaker. Occasionally
we ask if that speaker is using his or her terms according to the norms that he
or she upholds. This is far more diXcult than simply understanding someone’s
words, and there is evidence that this skill only appears later in life. According
to Gilbert & Reiner (2000:276), students around 9 years of age attribute the same
meaning to the phrases “theories which explain phenomena” and “the behaviour
of phenomena.” At ages of 12-16 years, students can see the diUerence between
true and false explanations, but not until they are about 16 do they fully appre-
ciate that knowledge claims are mostly conjectural. The ability to distinguish
between what someone says and what they should say, is hard won. How do
students decide what a concept should mean? As we saw above, students often
invent imaginary scenarios to test their concepts and inter-conceptual relations.
So again, guesses (or intuitions) are a necessary Vrst step in the act of determin-
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ing what a person should mean as opposed to what they do mean. And those
intuitions are the material on which to run the method; they do not bear all of the
epistemological weight of the method’s output.
Let us now turn back to conceptual analysis and see how the principle of
charity can be used to defend the charge from experimental philosophy.
Remember there are several aims of philosophical conceptual analysis: speci-
fying and exploring the intension and extension of a concept, its relation to other
concepts, and its normative proVle. Just as in linguistic interpretation, which has
similar goals, charity and intuition are called for in all cases. To determine the
extension of a concept we often begin by considering its explicit or implicit def-
inition in the hands of certain individuals (for example, knowledge for Plato or
Descartes). We try to adopt these deVnitions ourselves, and assuming our own
standards of rationality, try to maximize the truth of our beliefs. We invent imag-
inary scenarios in which to test the consistency of those beliefs. Once we have
a handle on the problems and possible relations between this concept and others,
we try to improve the concept. The point is that in many of the stages of this
process, intuitions are involved as raw materials, which do not need to be accu-
rate or true or justiVed. In this sense, intuitions in conceptual analysis function
like scientiVc hypotheses. And so, only if the scientiVc method is a bad one, is
philosophical conceptual analysis unreliable in principle.
One reply to this line of reasoning is the following. My argument attempts to
justify one use of intuition in conceptual analysis. But there are others that are
used as evidence, and it is those which are the focus of the Weinberg, Nichols
and Stich school of experimental philosophy. For example, if you give me a coun-
terexample to my proposed deVnition for justice, I might have an intuition that
your counterexample is a good one, that indeed it disproves my deVnition. This
sort of intuition is not a preliminary guess used to begin the process of conceptual
analysis. Rather, it is the source of justiVcation for this or that conceptual revision.
However, this type of intuition can also be treated as a provisional hypothesis
that should be tested. It is nothing but another hypothesis, although it is accom-
panied with a strong emotional response. But it is not the response that justiVes
the eventual outcome of the test. Of course, some provisional hypotheses are
more attractive, and upon hearing them we think “Yes! That must be the case!”
however they later prove false. The reason they seem so attractive is perhaps
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because they highlight a new perceived coherence between what we have, and
what we want (see Thagard & Stewart 2011).
Another objection is that by portraying conceptual analysis as linguistic inter-
pretation, I have likened it once again to reWective equilibrium, since the focus
here has been on making others and ourselves rational, consistent, true, and so
on. However, applying the principle of charity calls for both coherence and cor-
respondence. Our words have no meaning without interaction with the world
and with others, which is why causal connection is one of the constraints in the
principle of charity.
There is another important diUerence between interpretation, conceptual anal-
ysis and the scientiVc method on the one hand, and reWective equilibrium on the
other. ReWective equilibrium is a method that has as its goal a very speciVc end
state, and there are rules which we use to proceed to that state given the current
state. Namely, proceed in a stepwise manner evaluating the system and its con-
sequences with our intuitions until we achieve coherence. This is not the case
with the scientiVc method or, in my view, conceptual analysis or linguistic inter-
pretation. In general, science progresses from vague to speciVc, from less precise
to more precise, from less mathematical to more mathematical. But these general
trends are violated all the time, especially during scientiVc revolutions. And while
many philosophers talk meaningfully about the “end of science”, it is not such an
end point that drives today’s scientiVc investigations. It is local goals. And the
same goes for conceptual analysis. We would like, we suppose, a perfectly clear
deVnition of all human concepts, but that is not what motivates us in our quest
to understand knowledge and justice. We have subsidiary aims which are more
important. And even concerning individual concepts, we care more about Vnding
a workable deVnition that is enlightening and useful than we do about the one
true deVnition. I think this is because we recognize that concepts will and should
change over time. And the same is true of linguistic interpretation. We would
like to have a complete theory of meaning for a speaker, but we never actually
try to Vnd one. We use whatever methods we have until we reach a satisfactory
understanding of our speaker’s utterances. Perhaps we do not try to gain a com-
plete theory of meaning because we know that what a speaker means will change
over time, and so a complete theory of meaning is not a realistic end point for us.
In each of science, conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation, we do not
contextualize our actions with reference to an end point, and we do not follow a
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simple strategy to get there. So with respect to these important points, conceptual
analysis has not been reduced to reWective equilibrium.
The natural question to ask at this point is: well then, what are the sources
of evidence for conceptual analysis? There is probably no simple answer to this,
because a reliable method does not guarantee knowledge. A valid argument is
not necessarily a sound one. Cognitive scientists who study conceptual change
focus on the development of categorization schemas in children, undergraduates,
scientists, and so on, mapping out complex webs of conceptual connections and
simulating them in computers. But the exact way in which experience plays a
role in learning and (re)evaluating concepts is not yet known, and this collection
is a testament to how complex the problem is. What is necessary is some mid-
dle ground between the grand philosophical pictures (rationalism, empiricism,
naturalism) of the relation between experience and knowledge, and the work of
cognitive scientists and linguists.
To conclude: what I have tried to achieve in this paper is not a direct episte-
mological justiVcation of the output of conceptual analysis, but merely to provide
reasons to believe that the method of conceptual analysis is reliable. If we accept
the practices of experimental science and everyday linguistic interpretation, we
should also accept the method of conceptual analysis.
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